This article describes attitudes of V4 states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) and their activity in the fight against terrorism, and specifically in the fight against the so -called Islamic State that has appeared in 2014. In addition to applying role theory, the main aim of article is to define the roles that V4 states perform. The second aim is to give an explanation of their (non-)participation of active involvement in general in the fight against terrorism within the EU. The results showed that roles differ and only Poland is active in the fight against IS, however rest of V4 took part in passive support that relies on their size, budget and also political will. These results were observed in main statements made by policymakers of each particular state that have been done through content analysis.
Introduction
States fight against terrorism to protect their basic features such as internal and external security. It includes also security of people, territory, boundaries and institutions. New trends of terrorism show, that it is necessary to fight against terrorism due to its international (global) character. It should be states first choice to participate in the fight against terrorism.
In 2014 US president Barack Obama established an international coalition to fight terrorism as an answer to the rise of the so -called Islamic State (later only IS). IS was not only threatening states such as Syria and Iraq, but was also bringing foreign fighters together through its media influence. This has now become a threat to all who have engaged in the war on terror since 2001. 2 After destabilization in the Arab world after the so -called Arab spring, states in the region of North Africa failed and collapsed. This situation created new conditions for the spread of terrorism, especially concerning groups with a connection to Al -Qaida. However, terrorist organizations have mutated and split from Al -Qaida, especially the so -called Islamic State (or Daesh in the US). 3 The USA in 2014 called upon a Coalition to fight IS and all V4 states were included (together with other EU states, but the EU itself did not take any action). 4 In this article, I would like to point out the particular roles of these countries in terms of the fight against IS since 2014 and explain their different attitudes and behavior in the fight against terrorism. V4 is a specific group and it worth observing how they behave to protect EU security when it comes to the question of terrorism.
Islamic fundamentalism has changed the strategies of attacks and its goals. it creates a stabilized regional cooperative structure (Cabada -Waisová 2018) . The activity is sometimes common, however concerning terrorism; V4 does not play as a united actor. We could agree that V4 is at the crossroad between EU and NATO when we speak about fight against terrorism (Ušiak 2018) . One of the reasons why the starts behave like that is different position in the debate about migration flows and how it it connected to fight against terrorism (more detailed in Bauerová 2018) .
Why the V4 states concern about terrorism? The terrorist goal is no more the autonomy of a region as it was in Spain; the main aim of IS is to fight against each religion and to restore a new caliphate in current states that are not even Islamic by majority. The main idea of IS 5 was to create a new community from 2 The challenge has changed, from the fight against Al -Qaida to fight against any terrorists, even homegrown terrorist that has become a phenomenon, especially in EU.
3 Destabilization of states influenced unsatisfied people with Arab revolutions and they have become radicalized and have joined IS. Even Al -Qaida has ended binding to IS due to its unacceptable behavior towards Muslims and Muslim holy places. IS is a specific terrorist organization with new ways of behavior, they use media to spread radical ideology, recruit new fighters, spread fear and last but not least IS is tight to a territory, that was a new feature.
4 Terrorism is a new threat that the EU started to solve in a joint way after 9/11 2001 terrorist attack. Since that year radical Islamic terrorism became a new threat that is not possible to defeat it alone. It is hard to say whether terrorism is an external threat or internal threat to European security.
5 Islamic state is a specific terrorist organization based on new aim conquering the territory. It also differs from Al -Qaida because of that. Terrorists of IS seek for save -havens. The Islamic state has two faces: To conquer the territory and set up a caliphate outside EU; to conquer territory, spread fear and harm EU. EU has to face such challenge since 2014 when IS set a war against (not only) European states.
those that were vulnerable and to fight for a certain cause. For Europe Islamic terrorism was an external threat coming inside; however, with the so -called Islamic state, the situation is different. 6 The European Union (EU) is an international organization consisting of 28 states that all prefer to fight against terrorism outside the EU. This was declared in European security strategies in 2003, 2005, 2010 or 2016 . This means that all member states on the ground of the European Council have declared that they will fulfill the ideas of the fight against terrorism. Their interpretation of certain participation in this fight differs from state from state. According to their behavior, it would seem that the fight against terrorism is optional, because not all states participate in the same way. In some respects, small states in the EU are not very different from medium -sized and major European powers. The difference from France, Great Britain or Germany is obvious -small states have not yet become a terrorist target. However, this does not mean that the threat of terrorism is not their problem. Even small EU states exist in an interdependent world, and therefore politicians should respond to this threat. The successful fight against terrorism must be waged in two front lines. The first is inside Europe. V4 activity in the internal line is not questioned here.
Cooperation is carried out between information services, police, customs officers (in tracking suspicious persons), protection of important buildings etc. Important action has to be taken also outside EU. Within EU we can observe two types of activity, passive and active form. The passive form of cooperation is also highly important in the fight against IS; passivity, however, could mean a lack of awareness.
Terrorism is a topic that the European Union fails to solve. In the history of integration, we can observe the development of European securities -internal and external. In addition to this division, the EU still does not know whether security questions should be solved together or separately (i.e. on a supranational or intergovernmental level -more on this in Bauerová, Hlaváčková, Vošta 2018). 7 In this article, I have put three questions: (1) What roles do V4 states play in the fight against terrorism? (2) What are the limitations in their participation in the fight against terrorism in the EU framework? (3) What are the reasons for (non-)participation in EU external security actions to fight terrorism? Main 6 It has the power to fight from outside. That is the reason, why the response also must be taken externally, not only internally, as was more usual for other forms of terrorism in a historical perspective for some EU states.
7 Terrorism was classified as a threat to internal security, however, during a long period was observed that defeating terrorism is not possible only inside EU or member states. One of the new solutions since 2003 are EU missions inside unstable countries which should help stabilize the environment in the country. However, those missions are not the main action to fight IS. We can ask why? The reason is simple; there was no common action to send troops to Iraq or Syria. States did not find a common attitude so everyone solves it on his own. purpose is to show differences in the attitudes towards ways of fight against terrorism and limitations that has occurred during years. To follow the questions I have used as a theoretical framework role theory that is not a mainstream in foreign policy analysis, but is becoming more popular due to its effectiveness to help detect role(s) that particular state plays towards someone (or something). This role is consisting of expectations -internal and external, that are observable in speeches or interviews of policy makers. To explain the role of each state of V4, I do critical content analysis of main politicians of V4 states who deal with foreign policy and usually decides about way of fight against terrorism (in the meaning of external action) -president, prime ministers and ministers of foreign policy, defense or interior. Within this framework my theoretical basis is constructivism. The main reason is that it allows studying language and speeches that can uncover the meaning behind the scene.
Briefly to the structure of this article, firstly I will explain theoretical framework (role theory and different concepts of role with its typology according to Kalevi Holsti (1973) and Lisbeth Aggestam (1999 Aggestam ( , 2006 . Secondly I will explain EU background of fight against terrorism and limitations inside EU that influence V4 participation. In the third part will be explained background of V4 states participation and in the last part I will explain the role typology that each V4 state plays in the context of fight against terrorism with focus on fight against so -called Islamic state.
Theoretical framework
There are several options concerning ways to study state behavior. In the context of theories of international relations, I interpret state behavior with constructivism, which is capable of uncovering state interests and, on the basis of main concepts -identity, norms of behavior, notions of power -show what is important for particular politicians.
Role theory is rarely used theory as an analytical framework; however it has few advantages, for example pretty exact definition of role creation and role performance. In constructivism, role theory has been used (more detailed in Harnisch 2014). Usually authors who use role theory are influenced by the concepts of language and identity. This brings us to problems of constructivism definition. The point is that, with constructivism, you do not have to use it as one theory -there is more than one version of constructivism and we can combine them as is done for example by L. Aggestam (1999) , who combines rational positions of realism where foreign policy is based on the maximization of gains; however, a role itself is socially constructed. In role theory, such a combination can be useful. When we speak about states and especially about state security, rationality is an expected characteristic. Power is also an important concept in constructivism. In my research, roles are socially constructed and states learn roles according to rules inside institutions (NATO and EU), but they are rational.
For the foreign policy of states, material sources are just as important as non--material, for example, normative and ideational structures (Reus -Smit 2009: 221-223) or power which does not come only from material sources. 8 I have chosen the work of Lisbeth Aggestam to show how roles are created. A role consists of internal expectations, external expectations, and identity. In this combination of states, policymakers create roles. Role theory is a reflection of the international context. Role conception and its role performance has to be seen in a broader context of how foreign policy is created (Holsti 1970: 246) . According to Elgström and Smith (2006) , roles are constructed by power in the international system or by the status of the actor. Small states are predetermined to play different roles, without high goals or leadership. The roles of small states are determined by their relationship to the external environment.
We can name roles according to these specific relations and performance of actors. There is a connection between the process of role conception and external expectations. The role is then influenced by norms and values which the state accepts. According to Lisbeth Aggestam (1999 Aggestam ( , 2006 , roles are constructed and accompanied by these characteristics: (1) Role expectations -can be external and internal. Internal expectations are formed by political culture, society, and politicians themselves. External expectations are formed by an institutional structure where the actor belongs. (2) National role conceptionthis is a normative interpretation of the actor. Conception is long -term and shows what possibilities and strategies an actor can play. It is formed by history, culture and societal characteristics. Role conception is linked to the concept of identity. Identity is a part of role conception and has influence on its form. Creation of role is part of social reality and is formed by external and internal actors. These actors create some expectations, which can form the role itself. In some cases, the role can be changed in time. This is connected with norm and ideational changes. This is called the process of socialization, which is very important for constructivists. (3) Role performance -is the actual behavior of the actor. It can be influenced by specific situations. The actor plays its role. (4) Role change -the role is a stable figure; it has to be consistent so politicians can fulfill it. The role can be changed in the context. The situation must be severe -political instability, change of norms, and speculation about the role.
K. Holsti showed 17 roles of states that can be played. In these 17 types, there are some types which are not suitable for this time period (he created it during the Cold War) and some of the types are not suitable for small states. The table below lists all of them. Here I will work only with the ones that seem useful in current times and topic. The table includes types of roles according to responsibility, i.e. whether such a state prefers to be responsible or not. Perception and performance of responsibility is a key feature for actors who are or are not reliable and credential. Other specificities of roles are the types of action that states preform connected to other actors who are in symmetric or asymmetric relation. When we work with a concrete topic such as the fight against terrorism, the particular relation of one state towards another is always relevant. This is because the fight against terrorism is not (should not be) an individual action. The fight against terrorism always has causes and consequences. Holsti (1973) .
This role typology was created in the Cold War, where partnership mattered. In this period of time, partnership also matters in terms of the fight against terrorism. When the role is called for example "developer", we are dealing with a state that helps to stabilize fragile countries. Such a state needs to have prerequisites in the material base, such as finance or military power. The role of the independent player is important for the collective actor because this kind of actor will play on his own interests. He feels unbounded by rules and norms and cooperates with whoever he wants. Such types of roles exist in any context. A regional subsystem cooperator is an actor who supports ties and participates in mediation in conflicts. Such a state is open to commitments in the region. The ally prefers close cooperation and creates special relationships and strategic partnerships. A security promoter has responsibility and commitments towards the region and international security. In this typology, we can see the influence of realism, but also constructivism due to some roles that put pressure on norms, rules, and perhaps also collective identity. In this article, research was carried out with qualitative methodology via critical content analysis of discourse produced by the main politicians who deal with state security, especially the fight against terrorism, and more specifically fight against IS since 2014 in V4 states. I have used the role types introduced above; the aim here is to detect a constructed role where role conception consists of attitude frames, decisions, activities, and commitments to the community constructed by politicians.
In the four selected cases (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) I have focused on discourse created by politicians, mainly decision makers. I have analyzed their speeches and interviews and according to the words used, I have assigned them types of roles. The documents used were taken from official government websites from foreign ministries. At first glance, it was not visible what roles they play; with deeper research, however, it became clear what the roles of the V4 are in the fight against terrorism, especially IS.
The fight against terrorism in the EU -current trends and limitations with respect to the V4
The fight against terrorism in the EU holds a prominent position among security topics. Until 2001, not so many countries in the EU had experience in the active fight against terrorism. Only Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain were those who had operational bodies to fight against such a threat. Cooperation on an EU level to fight terrorism was not a priority, due to the significance of sovereignty, in which every state secures itself. Terrorism was a threat to internal security (Druláková 2011: 63) . In the Maastricht Treaty, terrorism was dealt with in the third pillar on an intergovernmental level. However, when we look back, it could have been dealt with at any level of EU security, i.e. in each pillar (Zimmermann 2006) due to the connection of particular topics of EU security.
After 9/11, all EU states decided to take part in the reaction; however, the common action of EU was not activated. This threat showed no limits for terrorist attacks and the EU insisted on the idea that terrorism is still a matter of internal security; developed bodies (Europol, Eurojust) should fight against terrorism only on an intergovernmental level, e.g. only cooperation between states has emerged (Bendiek 2011: 5) . After these attacks, EU states proposed many types of action, however the only common EU action was a joint plan, which was hugely criticized as a wide -ranged plan with no proper deadlines or specific "to do's" for collective bodies (Bossong 2008: 33) . Some states have decided to participate in the actions of other international organizations such as NATO or actions together with the USA. None of them wanted to remain inactive, because 9/11 showed that the EU is not excluded; terrorist cells were established in Europe as well and such kinds of terrorism do not respect borders (Keukeleire -Delreux 2014: 152) . After the first massive action, states took part in international missions such as ISAF and created Provincial Reconstruction Teams to stabilize countries that inadvertently hosted terrorist organizations. Countries of the V4 also took part. However, it was not a common EU activitythe EU did not take part.
In 2014, more destabilized states have emerged. The EU had its chance to take action together in the case of Libya for example; however, after long discussions, the EU decided not to become involved in conflicts directly on EU borders, which was a huge mistake according to Engberg (2014) . This passive attitude is typical for EU states when the threat does not concern them directly -this applies not only to V4 states, but all EU states.
Scholars who focus on the evaluation of EU action, especially on EU missions, Katarina Engberg (2013 Engberg ( , 2014 , Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi (2009), Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli and Ane Peen Rodt (2011 Rodt ( , 2017 , agreed that lack of activity can come from: (1) EU strategic culture; (2) Post -heroic society; (3) Historical relations with EU states; (4) Fight for power inside the EU; (5) Internal relations and disputes within the EU 28; (5) Lack of one vision on missions and the EU role in world/region; (6) Non -existence of an EU army. All of those presuppositions together create the context of the EU's lack of active action despite all the road maps and action plans (see more on this in Bauerová -Hlaváčková -Vošta 2018) .
Typically small states are more passive than EU powers, so we need to explore the reasons for this. The V4 is a group of states that are small (geographically and according to their power), except Poland, which is not small geographically but in terms of power can be considered a small state. We can give several explanations for why small states of the EU do not participate so often in missions or in other external actions at all, not only in the fight against terrorism abroad: (1) Small states are more vulnerable to populism. Small states, typically the V4, are young democracies and are easily vulnerable to "euro bashing" used by populist parties inside states. (2) We can also observe strong Euroscepticism in V4 governments. This can obstruct various actions. (3) Politicians are concerned about double standards within the EU so this creates a feeling of inferiority. This goes along with the underrepresentation in the EU's external institutions such as EEAS EU headquarters. (5) A lack of resources or motivation to participate are arguments used by politicians. Later, I will point out discourses and arguments made by particular politicians to support these reasons for passivity and some reasons that push politicians to be more active in the field of securing Europe (more in Hlaváčková 2018) .
It should be mentioned that there are also motives and reasons that push states to participate. Those reasons can be seen in general, but each of them explains reasons for small states of the EU, especially the V4. For example, Russia's assertive revisionism in Eastern Europe brings V4 states to action. Another reason, which today seems to be the strongest, is that terrorism is a threat that can be decreased by missions or other external activity. This is linked to other reasons that push states into activity (and politicians are able to legitimize external action before society) -migration and migration flows. In this respect, it is also possible to help failed and destabilized countries, because they influence the security of V4 states (mainly financial resources).
Having now explained the reasons of (non-)participation in some kind of action, I would now like to focus in more detail on the action of V4 states. For a detailed explanation of participation, I have chosen the reaction to IS in the coalition against them.
Case studies of V4 states in the fight against IS

The Czech Republic
In 2015 the Czech Republic (CR) appeared on the list of states targeted by IS. This was a result of the action of CR to join the coalition that decided to fight against IS warriors within Europe and beyond. CR was one of first states to react to a call for help from the Iraqi Army by sending weapons and munitions to the country. After some time, the Czech government also sent battle planes. CR's participation in active support also included the training of Iraqi army pilots and police forces. The main impetus for such an activity was to stabilize Iraq and, by doing so, defeat the so -called Islamic State.
The image of a small state is projected into some arguments in which Czech politicians spoke about limited resources (i.e. finance and personnel). The discourse of politicians tends to argue that "we are a small country, but we do our best"; "We are active; we endeavor and try to help." 9 All arguments were mentioned without responsibility, and only added that: "we strengthen the security of Europe through our country's participation in the region of the Middle East." Politicians say that the threat cannot be ignored. Former Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka said that it is reasonable to be a part of the coalition in the fight against IS. Reversely, CR must also be on the list of the "Coalition of Devils", because it is a part of the active fight against terror together with Russia or China. President Miloš Zeman argued that we are in a "good club". Minister of Interior Milan Chovanec says that we are waging a war on terrorism, and the video where CR was included on the list is the most visible notion of terrorism in CR so far. Politicians have criticized the EU, claiming that it should coordinate action and that all states of the international community should participate in the stabilization of the Middle East. These words can be interpreted as the following: Czech politicians do not feel as if they can participate or organize something, only the EU and NATO should do this (CR, however, is a part of decision -making bodies). These actions together are the only solution to the migration crisis.
Czech support to fight IS has taken on new faces: for example medical team for an American army hospital in Iraq or the training of L-159 pilots. 10 CR has sent munitions to the Iraqi army and Kurdish militias. One example of less honest activity that CR has taken part in was a trade with the Iraqi army. CR sold 15 L-159 Alca planes including services and training. The mandate of the training mission finished at the end of 2018. Such activity was hugely criticized by the Czech opposition and other countries. Firstly, it was only a deal to get rid of old machines; today it is called aid in the fight against radicals. There is also another aid to the Middle East, for example, in the form of material support. Material aid was sent to Jordan -3.8 million bullets for assault rifles and 3 million bullets for machine guns. The total value was 14 million CZK. 11 The Iraqi army also received 3,000 new machine guns and 3,600 old machines guns together with 7. 2 million bullets for 21 million CZK. Part of this load was delivered by the Americans to the Kurds. Before this, the Czech Republic sent 8 million bullets for machine guns and 5,000 rockets for RPG7. This was old equipment donated by the Czech army. In 2015 another gift was made by the Czech side -10 million bullets for machine guns and 5,000 hand grenades to Kurdistan and Iraq. 12 Czech discourse on how to fight against IS has been divided since the beginning of the debate. President Zeman said that there is a need to join actively in the fight against Islamist centers. 13 Former Prime Minister Sobotka showed the opinion of government, which was only to take passive action -i.e. support, but not be involved in the war. Despite its activity, the Czech government said it would not participate in airstrikes against IS. In Czech discourse, no other reason the country should help was found, only the need to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. Nothing personal or connected to culture or religion arose. No responsibility on CR's part was mentioned. The country always claims it will participate, however without any responsibility. This means it does so voluntarily, which is visible in the case of other states as well. This attitude hugely defines the role that CR plays in the context of the fight against terrorism, which is focused on IS. We can say that such an attitude seems aimed only at "showing the flag", which is done very often by small states. The only pledges that were made were to contribute "various kinds of weaponry to the Iraqi army including L-159 fighter jets" that will help train Kurds fighting IS in Iraq. CR has sent more than $1.5 million in humanitarian aid for victims of the Syrian conflict and financially supported the International Organization for Migration's and UNICEF's work with refugees in northern Iraq. External expectations of CR were constructed by other states and representatives of international organizations and by the norms and rules within these organizations. The Czech Republic wishes to fulfill expectations of a "good" NATO member. Under NATO's rules, it felt obliged to fulfill NATO's commitments. Internal expectations refer to what is expected from politicians, government, presidents and prime ministers and other ministers internally, i.e. inside the state.
Internal expectations prevail in terms of what the country should do and why. On the contrary, such expectations also capture how others will react to particular activity. In the Czech Republic (and Slovakia) politicians said that it is "reasonable to be part of such a coalition", politicians expected the fulfilling of its international obligations. Czech politicians did not speak about the fight against terrorism as a norm or rule. The fight against terrorism can bring prestige; this was visible in Czech discourse. It was also mentioned by politicians that aid is a good business because the Czech Army sold airplanes to the Iraqi army because those airplanes are at the end of their "expiration date". The Czech government counts this "aid" in the total expenditure of donated aid. It is also a good way to explain to their citizens the reason for their participation, using arguments like "it is expected of us" or "we need to fulfill our commitments to the international community." 14
Hungary
According to Security Advisor to the Prime Minister Bakondi, IS represents an extremely serious security risk. All EU states should monitor movement along all three migration routes, i.e. Balkan, Italian and Spanish routes, which has increased recently in respect especially to fighters with EU citizenship. Hungary is also participating in the war on terrorism, especially the war against IS. According to the government, it is "the greatest global danger to the civilized world." Hungary has been a member of the coalition against terrorism from the very beginning and is one of the 27 countries that are sending troops into battle against IS.
This V4 country participated in the active fight against IS and the promise of government was to increase its military participation. There are Hungarian troops in Iraq and the number was increased to 200 since the end of 2017 (to 2019). 15 Troops were deployed since 2015 with a training mandate in Erbil. 16 Péter Szijjártó, minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, made the pledge during an international conference against terrorism held in Washington that Hungary would actively participate, a pledge they subsequently fulfilled.
Discourse in Hungary is more open to active action with US leadership. The Hungarian government preferred the strategy of US president Donald Trump with the words that: "someone has to lead the fight against terrorism." This position was compared to the previous US administration under Barack Obama, who criticized Hungary for violations of democracy. Since democracy is no longer the focus of US foreign policy, the relations between US -Hungary can improve and both sides can cooperate on the fight against IS. The reason for Hungarian participation is "because the terrorist organization is one of the causes of migration pressure on Europe, and because the Islamic state is striving to destroy Christian communities in other parts of the world." The reaction to fight against IS was called unavoidable, and Zsolt Németh (chair of Parliament foreign affairs committee) said also that this is combined with ethical considerations which underpin Hungary's deployment of troops.
The Minister said that 9/11 clearly showed that the threat of terrorism is a global phenomenon, highlighting that the primary target of all political leaders must be to guarantee the security of their people and countries. 17 Politicians referred to historical experience and claimed that "Hungary may never fall again", i.e. that Hungary will never again fall victim to Islamic "conquest", as stated by Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén 18 . 19 To respond, Minister of Hu-man Capacities Zoltán Balog told that the task is not only to help where there is trouble but to also draw the attention of the international public to the topic and to initiate international action. 20 The Hungarian government linked the need to act against the genocide against Christian minorities. It said it had a Christian commitment to Christian values. The government said that sending troops is nothing special, that "combating ISIS is a fundamental human and ethical responsibility, and it is also our obligation as an ally." The need for solidarity towards those Christian and other religious minorities around the world that are being persecuted 21 is a natural obligation of Hungary as a state that has a Christian identity as well as Christian ties in its history. Another reason why Hungary developed such activity is that the government has seen the need to stop migration flows from this region. Specific activity was sent to Kurdistan -Training Coordination Centre in Erbil in Northern Iraq -to provide support. For Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó, the role of US and their strategy to fight IS is the most important; in the long term it will be impossible to handle the migration crisis without the total eradication of IS. Not only active participation can stop terrorism, but also activities in stopping the financing of terrorism, especially IS and the reduction of terrorist propaganda. 22 The discourse was divided. In the parliament, some parties, including Jobbik were against the active participation in the fight against IS. However, the government has decided to be active in the future as well. They had already said in 2017 that the US can "rely on Hungary" in the fight against IS and strengthening NATO's European army. Therefore, a clear preference for NATO was expressed but no comments were made about responsibility. 23 In comparison to the Czech Republic, Hungary is more active and more open to the active involvement of its army. There has also been criticism of NATO from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade that "NATO could do more than it did so far." 24 External expectations created in Hungary showed that politicians often mentioned NATO, however they also often mentioned their motivation in "following US strategy". This has connotations with US President Trump, who has not criticized Hungary for its internal politics (contrary to the previous US President Obama). It could be expected that all V4 states feel pressure to be part of the antiterrorist coalition. What is interesting is that no politician spoke about the EU as an actor to combat IS. Internal expectations in Hungary were that politicians expect the fulfilling of its international obligations.
Another impetus for participation was visible in following: in Hungary, it was mentioned that terrorism threatens Christian values and that they need to be secured. Hungary has experienced migration flows and took steps to stop it, and the fight against terrorism is one possible solution to this. Hungary has also joined on the ground, but not in the battlefield.
Slovakia
Slovakia was more reserved in the situation of active involvement in the fight against IS. 25 In 2014 they have considered two types of activities, military and technical aid. Firstly they have excluded the possibility to send soldiers. Minister of Foreign Affairs Miroslav Lajčák has said: "We are aware of our responsibility since it is a threat that pertains also to us, so we will not close our eyes before it." Slovakia became a member of the coalition to fight terrorism as well, but according to the government it will not send soldiers to provide military training and contribute $ 25,000 to the International Organization for Migration for its work in northern Iraq. Minister Lajčák said that there is a will to fight the terrorist organization; however, it is highly powerful and therefore defeating it will require cooperation and common action. 26 It was obvious in the observed discourse that Slovakia had reasons to participate, however only with a small contribution. It seemed that the threat was not perceived to be their own, but as help to someone else. 27 This is a different attitude than in Hungary and Poland.
Reasons for such an attitude were mentioned by Minister of Foreign Policy and European Affairs Lajčák, who said that military action in countries fighting against IS must be done together with the political process. He justified the reason for non -participation with the argument that in Syria there are multiple actors in the conflict and to solve the problems, it is necessary to lower the number of participants. This was connected with the explanation that an improvement to this situation will diminish the threat and "people can come home", thus solving problems with migration.
There was a possibility to send troops to train Iraqi military and Kurds while politicians said that they have to help. 28 However, Slovakia has chosen passive support, which means that in discourse they are strong and have mentioned the responsibility to fight terrorism; however, in reality they are passive. The Slovak government has provided only humanitarian aid. Slovakia has sent at least £ 15,000 to assist soldiers in the Kurdish region of Iraq. 29 Another activity was that Slovakia shared experiences and know -how in the training of an Iraqi demining unit. It has the aim (through programs financially and with materials) to support migrants from. The third type of participation was help through IOM, which is intended to help people from Syria and Iraq who have left their homes because of IS. This amounted to 14 million EUR. 30 As a typical small state, Slovakia remained more passive without any obligation to fight. However, Slovak politicians felt some pressure to participate in some way, and so they have chosen humanitarian support.
External expectations created by Slovakia's politicians have mentioned that they feel a responsibility in the fight against terrorism and that the threats "pertain also to us". Internal expectations refer to same reason as in other countries. Slovak politicians said that it is "reasonable to be part of such a coalition". In Slovak (and Polish) discourse, I have the found the justification that the international community needed help to defeat the threat. In Slovakia, politicians speak of only one solution, which is humanitarian aid. These reasons justify their activity (or the lack thereof) in the fight against However, there are also other reasons that politicians speak about their limits -limits of the state, personal, financial.
Poland
Poland was the only country who joined the fight against IS in an active mode. This took place in 2016 shortly after the coalition was established. There was a reason for this -the Polish government was waiting for a reply from NATO on the extension of participation in the eastern border of the EU. 31 Poland promised support to Middle Eastern action when NATO will support active participation on the EU's eastern border.
Defense minister Antoni Macierewicz said that "the scale of its involvement would depend on NATO's response to Russia's assertiveness." 32 The first impetus for participation was that partners have suffered casualties and sustained losses, so this was a reason to liberate territories taken by IS in Iraq or Syria; otherwise, NATO would have serious problems. Poland and its politicians argued that they have made a serious effort to destroy IS. Before their active participation, ex -minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak said that "Poland does not envisage participation of its soldiers in military operations, though it intends to politically support the coalition and organize humanitarian aid." They later changed their opinion for several reasons: the threat has increased and it has become obvious that participation is needed even from small states of the EU. In the case of the fight against terrorism, actions on the NATO platform are more important for Poland. Poland's foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski said that "The Islamic state poses a threat to the entire Western civilization and Poland must be part of the global effort to fight it,"
We can see here a sort of responsibility or at least the will to play an active role in the fight against IS. 33 The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs also criticized countries of the EU for contributing only a small amount of funds to security. 34 Poland's contribution to the campaign against the Islamic State could involve reconnaissance and training, Macierewicz said. Due to Poland's participation, reluctance on the part of Polish society to re -engage militarily has appeared, not only in Iraq but in the Middle East in general. The question then arises about the sense of Poland's joining the international coalition against IS. 35 A Polish contingent composed of up to 150 soldiers backed by four F-16s was deployed to Kuwait and tasked with reconnaissance missions. Another 60 soldiers went to Iraq to train and advise local Special Forces, 36 while 60 members of the Special Forces have been sent to Iraq according to Poland's top security official Pawel Soloch. 37 In 2019 had appeared another reason to participate. On of the terrorists from 2015 Paris attack (member of IS) was sentenced in Poland to jail. Poland has the experience with a terrorist on its territory. Prime minister Morawiecki has stated, that NATO is a guarantor of Polish security, not EU.
In Poland, there was little concept of responsibility. They were the only country of the V4 who participated in both military operations and humanitarian aid. 38 As external expectations Polish politicians have reiterated that Poland wants to be a good (Western) ally and a good member of NATO. There was, however, a game being played here in the background concerning negotiations between Poland and the USA on the Eastern Partnership, where Poland promised to join the coalition if the USA takes part in stronger cooperation in Eastern Europe. Internal expectation were observed in the meaning that Polish politicians expected to be respected (by NATO members) when they participate in the fight against IS. It is understandable that small states (which are not in great danger) do not participate only because they would like to defeat terrorism, but also because they know that the international community (NATO) is waiting for their participation. In Poland, politicians spoke about responsibility. Politicians in all five states mention different reasons to participate. In Poland politicians mentioned that partners (in the fight against terrorism) have suffered casualties and they feel the need to help these partners. Only Poland was most active from all V4 states.
Roles and their limitations 39 as a conclusion
In the introduction I have set main research questions: (1) What roles do V4 states play in the fight against terrorism? (2) What are the limitations in their participation in the fight against terrorism in the EU framework? (3) What are the reasons for (non-)participation in EU external security actions to fight terrorism? Main purpose is to show differences in the attitudes towards ways of fight against terrorism and limitations that has occurred during years. Let's show the results. V4 states and especially the small ones have chosen more passive participation, with the exception of Poland. We can see a conclusion of their participation in the table below. On the contrary, such expectations also capture how others will react to particular activity. All V4 states showed their expectation to be seen as a great partner, who can be trusted. In the discourse of decision -makers is possible to observe reasons that cannot be separated from the construction of identity of each state. I have followed the question of whether the fight against terrorism (IS) is the reason to participate and whether it is part of a state's identity. The analysis shows that it is not a part of identity and reasons vary from state from state. Common to almost all five countries is that they are small countries with limited sources. We can hear politicians speak about "doing their best" in the fight against IS. Responsibility is shuffled to the international community and other states. Only Poland was most active (due to a barter trade with the USA).
To detect a significant role, I had to divide the role into smaller pieces, i.e. into a process that creates the role (parts above). To find proper roles, I used Kalevi Holsti's table of roles and searched for the common activities of each state. Now it is possible to make some conclusions about the roles. The Czech Republic can be called a developer. Such a role is connected with stabilization and development of states who suffer terrorism (Iraq and Syria). The Czech Republic also surely plays the role of independent actor. This actor chooses whether it will join the action after assessing whether it is worthwhile or not.
No one can count on such an actor. Hungary and Slovakia also play roles of developer and independent actor. Poland also performs the role of ally. This role does not take responsibility for an action, but Poland plays a role with a sort of responsibility; it can be called a promoter of security. Such a role means that this actor takes responsibility in the promotion of security in the countries or region. Other actors can count on it for help. Participation in actions such as the fight against terrorism is driven by several factors. I have mentioned them above and I would like to stress some of them here. Small states usually consider NATO as a security provider (with the participation of NATO) and usually take some part in antiterrorist (anti IS) action. This is a phenomenon that does not affect any of the V4 states internally, so it is very hard for politicians to justify participation abroad. When the V4 participates, they are not vulnerable to duplicate such action in other organizations. The fight against terrorism (especially IS) struggles with EU internal constraints that relate to the process of any external security action. Most V4 politicians usually speak about the efficiency of such anti -terrorist actions; for them, more useful (i.e. related to each state) actions are carried out inside the state, not outside. The fight against terrorism is related to the stabilization of failed states and it is a long -term process. Such a process is not favorable for politicians, because they need immediate changes to show voters their success. In regard to the capability of deployment of small states, some of them, to show the flag, participate; however, they have problems with army unit deployment because of capacity. Each V4 member has other commitments in other missions and the capacity of a small state is not endless.
To sum up the analysis, there are few facts that I would like to stress in the discourses of these four states. (1) All V4 countries call for common action and responsibility of the international community and do not feel significantly re-sponsible for the fight against IS, with the exception of Poland, which is a special case. Poland has decided to play a more important role, and in its discourse we can observe notions of responsibility. (2) They link NATO and the fight against terrorism inside the Coalition against Terrorism together as one action (which it is not). All states see the fight against terrorism as a commitment to the international community (NATO, not the EU in this case). (3) States participate because partners of the international community are involved too. A strong reason to be a good member of NATO is visible here. (4) Other countries (not only Hungary) held discussions that the fight against IS should stop migrations flows, that is strong argument towards their citizens. (5) Politicians also argue that military action has to go hand in hand with political solutions. To summarize, I think there is another reason that small states of the EU participate in the fight against terrorism: (6) They simply want to show their flag and gain prestige. If this were not true, they would help more than just by providing (humanitarian) aid or military support. They would actually participate (with the exception of Poland, which promised participation). However, small states and their politicians are conflicted when it comes to this topic, because military participation is not popular. Politicians could lose their support and maybe lose their jobs. But when should terrorism be defeated if not now? The fight against terrorism should not be optional.
For the EU, the non -participation of the V4 (except Poland) means that these states are not responsible in terms of European security and are not trustworthy. The question is why there is not so much activity in the fight against terrorism and when it will be more suitable to participate? Why the states leave active participation behind? The EU's small states should not make their decisions based on what is or is not a viable topic for their citizens and voters, but instead think about European security. Another question is how to overcome the feeling of redundant activity (small states think that only the big states of the EU matter and leave the responsibility to the bigger ones or other organizations when it comes to security).
